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INCREASING DENALI KIDCARE
ELIGIBILITY: THE LIFEBOATS ARE
HERE
ALEXANDER SADIGHI*
ABSTRACT
In this Note, the Author analyzes the current state of Denali KidCare. The
Author summarizes the history of state-provided health insurance for
children and the particular difficulties associated with providing health care
in Alaska. In light of the recent passage of the Children’s Health Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act in 2009, the Author then investigates the
increased incentives for states to expand health care coverage to more
children and describes Alaska’s failure to take advantage of these
opportunities. The Article concludes with an argument in favor of specific
steps that would allow Alaska to provide health care to as many children as
possible at the lowest cost.
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INTRODUCTION
Alaska—The Last Frontier—has been a place where people go to
hide, to escape, to live in seclusion and free of intrusion. Such desires
are made possible by a land that is one-fifth the size of the United States,
and larger than Texas, California, and Montana combined.1 A land of
such tremendous proportions allows for a population density of 1.07
persons per square mile.2 Such a vast and unsettled land, however, leads
to many costs.
Alaska depends on world demand for its products, including oil,
fish, minerals, and timber.3 Dependence on such commodities results in
booms and busts, seasonal employment, and general instability.4 These
factors, together with the state’s geography, make providing health care
in Alaska particularly difficult and problematic—both in terms of
quality and cost.
For example, as of 2007, Alaska’s unique situation has resulted in
an insurance market where two companies control ninety-five percent
of the market.5 Such a market leads to a state of affairs where certain
low-income residents—too wealthy for Medicaid—could have to pay up
to twenty percent of their incomes for health insurance.6 It is simple
enough to understand that when families have to choose between
buying insurance costing twenty percent of their income and having no
insurance at all, the result will be many uninsured families and children.
In Alaska, around 18,000 children are uninsured.7
The federal government has been aware of this problem, which has
arisen in many states. In response, it enacted the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (S-CHIP)—now called “CHIP”—which the Obama
administration reauthorized in the Children’s Health Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA).8 But Alaska is failing its
families and children by not taking full advantage of the benefits
provided under CHIPRA to help families too wealthy for Medicaid but

1. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS. STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN 5,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/AK
CurrentStatePlan.pdf [hereinafter STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. AM. MED. ASS’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE 7 (2007).
6. See STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR., STATE HEALTH ACCESS
PROFILE: ALASKA 1 (2007), available at http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/
states/profiles/alaska_0.pdf.
7. Id.
8. See Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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too poor to afford private coverage.9 The federal government is sending
Alaska lifeboats to help insure its children, but Alaska has chosen to
reject them.
This Note will argue that Alaska needs to change its CHIP laws
and policies to better suit low-income children and families. Part I
provides the background and origins of S-CHIP. Part II addresses
CHIPRA and the changes it established in the system—specifically in
terms of finance and outreach. Parts III and IV address Alaska’s
background and health care situation. Part V describes Denali
KidCare—Alaska’s CHIP. Finally, Part VI provides analysis for what
Alaska needs to do to exploit CHIPRA fully and efficiently to provide
low-income Alaskan families with maximum benefits.

I. HISTORY OF THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter introduced the Child Health
Assessment Program to Congress—a major piece of legislation designed
to improve health services for children of low-income families.10 In the
late 1980s, budget legislation phased in Medicaid coverage for children
in poverty.11 Additionally, states extended coverage to children and
parents at higher income levels through Medicaid options and
demonstration waivers.12 By 1997, around twenty-one million children
were enrolled in Medicaid.13
In 1997, President Clinton focused his efforts on a
disproportionately uninsured group: families too wealthy for Medicaid
but too poor to afford private insurance.14 This group fell between 100%
and 200% of the poverty line.15 What resulted were proposals of
different types. For example, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Ted
Kennedy (D-Mass.) proposed comprehensive coverage, while other
senators proposed expanding Medicaid.16 The final product was the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP), established by the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and enacted under Title XXI of the Social
Security Act.17 Professor Lambrew18 described S-CHIP as “a fine

9. See infra Part VI.
10. Health Care Legislation Message to the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 717
(April 25, 1977).
11. JEANNE M. LAMBREW, THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 1 (2007).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8092/0510-SCHIP.pdf.
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balance—hard wrought but designed to maintain equilibrium between
states and the federal government as well as political conservatives and
liberals.”19
States were charged with administering S-CHIP within broad
federal guidelines, and states and the federal government jointly
financed it.20 States were given great flexibility in designing their
programs.21 For example, in 2006, twenty-six states had eligibility
thresholds at 200% of the poverty level and nine had thresholds at less
than 200%; states went as low as 140% and as high as 350%.22 The
poverty guidelines are issued each year by the Department of Health
and Human Services.23 In 2009, the poverty guideline for a family of
four in the forty-eight contiguous states and Washington, D.C. was
$22,050.24 For a family of four in Alaska, the poverty guideline for 2009
was $27,570.25
States were able to administer S-CHIP in three different ways: (1)
by expanding Medicaid to cover ineligible children; (2) by creating a
separate program under S-CHIP; or (3) through some combination of
the first two methods.26 If a state chose to expand Medicaid, it had to
provide the same benefits as were already provided under the Medicaid
program and had to apply the same rules and regulations.27 If a state
chose to create a separate program under S-CHIP, it was subject to
minimum standards set by the federal government.28
Federal funding for S-CHIP was allocated based on a formula
taking into account the number of children in low-income families, the
number of uninsured children, and the wages in health services.29 This
method gave the most funding to states with the greatest number of
uninsured children, but it caused major distribution imbalances.30 Some
states with a high number of uninsured low-income children received
too much money—more than they were spending—and some states
received too little.31

18. Professor Lambrew is an associate professor of Public Affairs and
director of the Health and Human Services Office of Health Reform at the
University of Texas at Austin.
19. LAMBREW, supra note 11, at 2.
20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VII.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199,
4199 (Jan. 23, 2009).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VII.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, MORE FUNDING FOR CHIP, DIFFERENT
RULES: HOW DOES CHIPRA CHANGE CHIP FUNDING? 3 (2009), available at http://
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/chipra/funding.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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States were required to provide matching funds and were given
three years to spend their federal allotment; if a state did not spend its
federal allotment, the leftover money would be redistributed to a state
that had exhausted its allotment.32 To incentivize state participation, the
federal government paid a higher share of the spending on S-CHIP than
it did in Medicaid.33 The federal government’s matching rate varied
between states from sixty-five percent to eighty-three percent, compared
to fifty percent to seventy-six percent for Medicaid spending.34 S-CHIP
also differed from Medicaid in that it was not an entitlement program
without limits on spending; S-CHIP was a grant program with federal
spending capped in advance.35
S-CHIP was successful in reducing the number of low-income
uninsured children. In the last decade, as a result of Medicaid and SCHIP—combined with states expanding eligibility and adopting
streamlined enrollment procedures—the percentage of low-income
uninsured children decreased by one-third.36 In 2007, states were
continuing to improve S-CHIP coverage for low-income uninsured
children.37 Of the twenty states that expanded S-CHIP eligibility, twelve
raised the income eligibility limits to 300% of the poverty guideline.38 SCHIP reauthorization was not seamless. President George W. Bush
vetoed two versions of legislation reauthorizing S-CHIP; in the end, SCHIP was temporarily extended through March 31, 2009.39

II. CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM
REAUTHORIZATION ACT
S-CHIP expired at the end of fiscal year 2007.40 But, on February 4,
2009, President Obama signed the Children’s Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) into law—it went into effect
April 1, 2009.41 President Obama called CHIPRA a “down payment on
[the] commitment to cover every single American.”42 CHIPRA’s
purpose is to “provide dependable and stable funding for children’s

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VII.
Id. at VIII.
Id.
Id.
DONNA COHEN ROSS & CARYN MARKS, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID
AND THE UNINSURED, CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING HEALTH COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN
AND PARENTS IN A RECESSION 3 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/7855.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 13.
41. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
42. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Overview National CHIP
Policy, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
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health insurance . . . in order to enroll all six million uninsured children
who are eligible, but not enrolled . . . .”43
A.

Financing

CHIPRA extends funding for the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) through 2013.44 The total allotments given to states
under CHIPRA are as follows: fiscal year 2009, $10,562,000,000; fiscal
year 2010, $12,520,000,000; fiscal year 2011, $13,459,000,000; fiscal year
2012, $14,982,000,000; and for fiscal year 2013, there will be two semiannual payments of $2,850,000,000.45 In addition to increasing the total
amount of funds available to the states, CHIPRA changed the allotment
formula to distribute funds more efficiently.46
For fiscal years 2009 and 2010, allotments will not take into account
how much the states spent in the past, so all states will receive more
money than they have in the past.47 But, beginning in 2011, allotments
will be based on how much states previously spent. For example, the
2011 allotment will be based on how much states spend in 2010.48 This
method of allotting funds based on past usage incentivizes states to
increase enrollment in the program; if they do not, they will lose funds.
For fiscal year 2010, allotments will be calculated based on the amount
of the state’s allotment in 2009 plus the amount of funds paid to cure
shortfalls, multiplied by the allotment increase factor.49 The allotment
increase factor will help prevent shortfalls from occurring by taking into
account expansion in health care costs and increases in the number of
children in each state.
States have two years—instead of the three years given under SCHIP—to spend their annual allotments.50 If a state does not expend its
entire allotment, the unused funds will be redistributed to “shortfall
states.”51 Shortfall states are those with approved child health plans and
whose projected expenditures under such plan exceed the sum of: the
remaining funds from the previous year, the amount of the child
enrollment contingency fund payments, and the amount of the state’s
allotment for the fiscal year.52

43. Pub. L. No. 111-3 § 2.
44. Id. § 101.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(a) (2006).
46. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(m)(2)(A)(i) (2006). The allotment increase factor,
commonly referred to as the “inflation factor,” is calculated with a formula: ((1 +
the percentage increase in per capita national health expenditures over the last
year) × (1 + the percentage increase in the number of children in the state over
the last year)). 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(m)(5) (2006).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(e)(1) (2006).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(f)(1) (2006).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(f)(2) (2006).
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To prevent against shortfalls, CHIPRA provides for a contingency
fund. CHIPRA establishes a fund in the federal Treasury known as the
“Child Enrollment Contingency Fund” (the “Fund”).53 The Fund is
comprised of money from the Treasury that is not otherwise
appropriated; enough will be appropriated to the Fund as is necessary
to make payments to eligible shortfall states.54 But there is a cap to the
contingency fund payments—the total amount available for payment
each year cannot exceed twenty percent of the year’s CHIP allotment.55
If the total state CHIP shortfalls exceed the amount available for
distribution in the Fund, then whatever money is in the Fund will be
proportionately distributed among the shortfall states.56 If the
contingency fund payment cap is not met in any given year, the excess
will be made available for performance bonus payments, discussed
below, to offset additional Medicaid and CHIP enrollment costs
resulting from enrollment and retention efforts.57
To receive money from the Fund, a state must demonstrate that its
CHIP expenditures are greater than its allotment for the respective year
and that it will exceed its CHIP enrollment target.58 The target number
of children enrolled is determined by increasing the number of children
enrolled from the previous year by the population growth factor.59 If a
state qualifies for contingency payments, the amount of money received
is based on the amount by which the enrollees exceed the enrollment
target and the per capita cost of CHIP coverage in the state multiplied
by the Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAPs).60
FMAPs are used to determine the amount of funds the federal
government will match for state expenditures. The FMAP for any state
is 100%, less the percentage that is provided by the state.61 For example,
if a state provides forty-five cents, the federal government will pay fiftyfive cents. CHIP’s FMAP—called the “enhanced FMAP” because it is a
higher federal contribution percentage than the regular FMAP, which
applies to Medicaid—is capped at eighty-five percent.62 This means that
the maximum the federal government may contribute is eighty-five
cents for every fifteen cents a state provides. The enhanced FMAP,
however, does not apply to all state CHIP expenditures. If a state

53. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(1) (2006).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2)(A) (2006).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2)(B) (2006).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2) (2006).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2)(D) (2006).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(3) (2006).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(3)(B) (2006). The child population growth factor is
equal to one plus the percentage increase in child population of the state from
July 1 in the previous year to July 1 in the fiscal year involved. 42 U.S.C. §
1397dd(m)(5). The percentage increase is itself determined by starting with the
most recent Bureau of the Census estimates before the year involved and then
adding one percentage point. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(3)(A) (2006).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(b) (2006).
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decides to include children whose families earn more than 300% of the
poverty line, the FMAP, rather than the enhanced FMAP, will apply.63
There is one exception: if a state had an approved program before
CHIPRA’s enactment that included children over the 300% poverty line,
then such a state is excluded from the cap.64
To incentivize states to enroll as many children as possible,
CHIPRA has added a bonus payment system.65 The bonus system
rewards states that are successful at enrolling low-income children in
Medicaid. This incentive exists because states need to be encouraged to
enroll the lowest-income children.66 Because of the higher federal
matching rate for CHIP relative to Medicaid, it costs a state more to
cover the lowest-income children under Medicaid.
States qualify for this bonus based on enrollments exceeding target
levels. The target level for 2009 is equal to the number of children
enrolled in 2007, increased by the population growth for children in the
state from 2007 to 2008 plus four percentage points, and further
increased by the population growth for children in the state from 2008
to 2009, plus four percentage points.67 For 2010–2012, the target levels
are based on the number of child enrollees for the state during the
previous year, increased by the population growth for children in the
state during the year, plus 3.5 percentage points.68 The statute also
provides guidelines for the targets from 2013–2015, as well as for
subsequent years.69
In addition to surpassing the target levels, states must meet at least
five of eight criteria to qualify for the bonus payments.70 These criteria
are: (1) continuous eligibility (thirty states comply with this
criterion71)—meaning the state has elected to provide enrolled children
continuous eligibility for a full twelve months;72 (2) liberalization of
asset requirements (thirty-six states)—meaning either the state does not
apply any asset or resource test for eligibility, or the state permits a
guardian to provide information relating to family assets and the state
takes steps to verify the assets other than by requiring documentation
from the guardian;73 (3) elimination of an in-person interview
requirement (thirty-eight states)—meaning the state does not require the
application or renewal to be made in person, nor does the state require a

63. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(8)(A) (2006).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(8)(B) (2006).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3) (2006).
66. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 9.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(C)(iii)(I) (2006).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(C)(iii)(II) (2006).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(C)(iii)(III)–(IV) (2006).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4) (2006).
71. All figures for the number of states complying with each criterion come
from: JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, COVERING MORE CHILDREN, REWARDING
SUCCESS: STATE PERFORMANCE BONUSES, 6–7 (2009), available at http://www.
familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/chipra/state-performance-bonuses.pdf.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(A) (2006).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(B) (2006).
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face-to-face interview, unless there are discrepancies;74 (4) use of a joint
application for Medicaid and CHIP (thirty-five states)—meaning only
one application is used for Medicaid and CHIP for both establishing and
renewing eligibility;75 (5) automatic renewal (fourteen states)—meaning
the state provides a pre-printed form, completed by the state based on
information available to the state, notifying the parent that eligibility of
the child will be renewed and continued based on such information,
unless the state is provided other information;76 (6) presumptive
eligibility for children (nine states)—meaning children who appear
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP will be presumed eligible at certain
qualified locations and can receive up to sixty days of coverage while a
formal determination is made;77 (7) express lane—meaning the state has
exercised its option to use a finding from an “Express Lane” agency78
(an agency that the state’s CHIP agency has determined is eligible to
make determinations of one or more eligibility requirements);79 (8)
premium assistance subsidies (fourteen states)—meaning the state has
elected to implement the option of providing premium assistance
subsidies (a way of putting CHIP or Medicaid dollars toward a family’s
employer-provided insurance coverage).80
If a state both exceeds its targets and meets at least five of the eight
criteria, it qualifies for per-child bonuses for all children enrolled in
Medicaid above the Medicaid enrollment target.81 States exceeding their
enrollment target by ten percent or less—referred to in the statute as
“first tier”—are awarded a bonus of fifteen percent of the projected per
capita state Medicaid expenditures for every child above the target.82
For example, if State X has a per capita Medicaid expenditure of $4000
(including both federal and state contributions), and State X has a fifty
percent FMAP, then State X’s share is $2000; the first-tier-bonus
payment would be fifteen percent of the state’s share—$300 in this
example—for every child above the target. Therefore, if State X enrolled
1000 children above the target, it would receive $300 per child for a total
of $300,000.
States exceeding the target by more than ten percent—second tier—
are awarded a bonus of 62.5% of the projected per capita state Medicaid
expenditures for every child above the first tier cutoff.83 For example,
assume that those 1000 children represent the state exceeding its target
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(C) (2006).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(D) (2006).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(E) (2006).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(F) (2006); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 7
tbl.2 (citing ROSS & MARKS, supra note 36).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(13)(F) (2006). This was a new provision as of 2009, so
no state had yet implemented the “express lane” option. See SULLIVAN, supra
note 71, at 7 tbl.2.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(G) (2006).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(H) (2006).
81. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 10.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
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by exactly ten percent. If State X had actually exceeded its enrollment
target by 1250 children—that is, by 12.5%—then State X would receive
the first tier bonus for the first 1000 children and would receive 62.5% of
the state expenditures for the 250 children by which the state enrollment
exceeded the first tier cutoff. In this scenario, State X would receive the
first tier bonus of $300,000, plus $312,500 ($1250 (62.5% of $2000)
multiplied by 250 (number of children above ten percent of the target))
for a grand total of $612,500.
B.

Outreach and Enrollment

In its efforts to expand health coverage for low-income children
who are eligible but not enrolled, CHIPRA created a $100 million
outreach fund.84 Grants will be awarded through 2013.85 Of the $100
million, $10 million is to be used to carry out a national enrollment
campaign,86 $10 million is to be used to award grants to Indian Health
Service providers and urban Indian organizations,87 and $80 million is
granted to other eligible entities, which may include: state, county, and
local governments; community-based or faith-based organizations;
schools; and federal safety net providers.88 The Centers for Medicaid
and Medicare Services (CMS) administer the grants.89 CHIPRA provides
that priority is given to entities proposing to target geographic areas: (1)
with high rates of eligible but un-enrolled children residing in rural
areas, (2) with racial and ethnic minorities and health disparity
populations, and (3) that submit the most demonstrable evidence
required.90
To apply for these grants, eligible entities must: (1) demonstrate
that they include members who have access to and credibility with
ethnic or low-income populations in the communities; (2) provide
evidence demonstrating that the entity has the ability to address barriers
to enrollment, such as lack of awareness of eligibility, stigma concerns,
or punitive fears associated with receipt of benefits; (3) give specific
quality or outcome performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness
of activities funded by a grant; and (4) provide assurances that the
eligible entity will assess the effectiveness of the activities, cooperate
with the collection and reporting of enrollment data, and, in the case of

84. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(g) (2006).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(a) (2006).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(a)(2) (2006).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(b)(2) (2006).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(f) (2006).
89. CENTER FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY
INST., AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHIPRA OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT GRANTS 1
(2009), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file
=ccf%20publications/federal%20S-CHIP%20policy/outreach%20grants%20final
.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF GRANTS].
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(b)(1) (2006).
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an eligible entity that is not the state, provide the state with enrollment
data.91
In announcing the grants, CMS provided that the purpose of the
grants is not only to enroll un-enrolled eligible children but also to
retain coverage as well.92 CMS has announced that it will award the
grant funds in different rounds.93 The first round will provide up to $40
million in two-year projects costing up to $1 million—CMS anticipates
awarding around two hundred grants in this first round.94

III. HEALTH CARE IN ALASKA: BACKGROUND
Many of Alaska’s health care problems result from its geographic
location, its size, its scattered population, and its seasonal employment
pattern. Relative to other states in the United States, Alaska has a very
young population, proportionately fewer females, proportionately more
Native people, and proportionately fewer African Americans.95 Alaska
is very large—one-fifth the size of the rest of the United States—and is
sparsely populated, with a population density of 1.07 persons per
square mile.96 Because Alaska lacks a complete road system, air or sea
travel is the primary way to reach most of the state.97
Alaska relies on seasonal employment for much of its industry,
including oil, timber, mining, fishing, and tourism.98 A higher
percentage of Alaskans are seasonally employed than in other states.99
As a result of the seasonal employment and the transitions in military
personnel, large numbers of people are often in search of
employment.100
Because a majority of Alaska’s population resides in Anchorage, it
is the only city in Alaska where specialized consultative services are
available.101 Alaska has two military hospitals: one in Anchorage and
one in Fairbanks.102 Smaller urban communities have access to
community hospitals.103
For rural Alaska, tribal health care is essentially the sole provider
of health care services.104 There are five hospitals in hub communities
for different regions.105 These hospitals send Alaska Native patients to

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(c)(1)–(4) (2006).
OVERVIEW OF GRANTS, supra note 89, at 2.
Id.
Id.
STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Native hospital located in Anchorage.106 Funded by the Indian
Health Service, twelve Native Health corporations manage the services
provided in more than two hundred villages in Alaska.107 With the help
of a physician over the phone, community health aides—trained
residents of a village—provide primary care and emergency services in
their communities.108 The state provides maternal and child health to
medically underserved areas through Public Health Nurses.109 Though
there are some preferred provider arrangements, managed care is not
thriving in Alaska;110 there are no health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) in the state.111
Approximately 18,000 children in Alaska (nineteen percent of
Alaska’s residents who are age eighteen or younger) are uninsured.112
Private health care coverage for children has declined over thirty
percent in the last ten years.113 Uninsured children with medical needs
are five times more likely to not have a regular doctor than are insured
children and are four times as likely to use emergency rooms, which are
considerably more expensive than a regular visit to the doctor.114
One major issue is that health insurance choices in Alaska are very
limited—Premera Blue Cross alone constitutes sixty percent of the
health insurance market share.115 The top two insurance providers in
Alaska account for ninety-five percent of the total market share.116 This
leads to expensive insurance policies.
The Child and Adolescent Health Measurement Initiative ranked
Alaska in the lowest group for percentage of children uninsured.117 The
same study shows that in 2007, 18.5% of children lacked consistent
insurance coverage in the previous year.118

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Medical Assistance Eligibility: Hearing on S.B. 13 Before the S. Comm. on
Health & Soc. Servs., 26th Leg., 1st Sess., 5 (Alaska 2009), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/26/M/SHSS2009-02-091334.pdf [hereinafter
Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs.].
113. Medical Assistance Eligibility: Hearing on S.B. 13 Before the S. Fin. Comm.,
26th Leg., 1st Sess., 9 (Alaska 2009), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/
pdf/26/M/SFIN2009-02-250903.pdf [hereinafter Hearing before S. Fin. Comm.].
114. Id.
115. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 7.
116. Id.
117. CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH MEASUREMENT INITIATIVE, 2007 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF CHILDREN'S HEALTH, http://nschdata.org/Rankings/RankingMap.
aspx?item=07_ind3_1chbk (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
118. CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH MEASUREMENT INITIATIVE, 2007 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF CHILDREN'S HEALTH, http://www.nschdata.org/StateProfiles/
CustomProfile 07.aspx?rid=5&geo2=Nationwide&geo=Alaska (last visited Apr.
10, 2010).
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IV. DENALI KIDCARE
When establishing its CHIP, Alaska had the option to create a
separate children’s health insurance plan, expand benefits under its
Medicaid plan, or enact some combination of both.119 Alaska chose to
expand benefits under its Medicaid plan and called the plan Denali
KidCare.120
A.

Background

Initially, Alaska expanded Medicaid eligibility to children up to
age nineteen with families earning 200% of the Alaska Federal Poverty
Guidelines (FPG) or less.121 But in 2003, Alaska reduced the eligibility to
children with families earning 175% or less of the Alaska FPG.122 This
meant that a family of four was ineligible if it earned more than $3555
per month.123 By 2007, the eligibility level from 2003—175% of Alaska’s
2003 FPG—had become the equivalent of 154% of the 2007 Alaska
FPG.124 On July 12, 2007, Governor Sarah Palin signed legislation
increasing the eligibility to 175% of the 2007 Alaska FPG.125 To prevent
the eligibility level from falling in real terms, similar revisions occur
annually.126
To increase enrollment, the State, through the Department of
Health and Social Services, attempted to separate the Medicaid
eligibility determination from public assistance programs, and it
engaged in expanded outreach efforts.127 These efforts were made to
remove any negative stigmatization from the Medicaid program so it
would not be considered a “welfare” program.128 There are now
separate
Medicaid
administrative
units
making
eligibility
determinations.129
Additional efforts were made to simplify the application process.
For example, any necessary follow-up is now done by phone.130
Furthermore, the asset test was eliminated, and continuous eligibility
was simplified to ensure that children would remain insured.131

119. See STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 3.
120. See id. at 9–10.
121. Id. at 9.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES FOR CHILDREN, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 4
(July, 2009), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/stateinitiatives
forchildren1.pdf.
125. Id.
126. See STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 9.
127. Id. at 10.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Continuity of care is very important in Alaska because of the high
percentage of the population that is seasonally employed.132
Denali KidCare applications are widely available, especially in
locations commonly visited by children and families.133 Additionally,
relationships have been formed with state and local governments,
schools, health care providers, tribes, and nonprofit organizations to
further promote Denali KidCare and support for eligible families in the
application process.134 Advertising has also been used to increase
awareness of the program.135 Grants have greatly empowered outreach
efforts, especially to Alaska Native communities, where Alaska Natives
make up a disproportionate percentage of the un-enrolled Medicaideligible population.136
When Denali KidCare was first implemented, children enrolled in
the program were given only six months of continuous eligibility.137
This made it more difficult to ensure continuity of care and was
cumbersome for families. But in April 2009, the continuous eligibility
was raised from six months to twelve months,138 meaning as soon as a
child is enrolled in Denali KidCare, he or she is guaranteed twelve
months of coverage, regardless of changes in income, resources, family
status, or household composition.139 The extension of continuous
eligibility allows Alaska to meet one more of the eight criteria necessary
to qualify for the performance bonus payments provided under
CHIPRA.140 This change also allows increased efficiency and decreased
administrative costs.141
To further facilitate continuity and ease of application, Denali
KidCare provides a preprinted renewal form, sent prior to eligibility
expiring.142 Currently, the forms are sent to families with their
information pre-completed and confirmation requested.143 An
alternative renewal option, encouraged by CHIPRA, is to require a
response to the pre-completed form only when income or other
circumstances have changed.144 The latter may be the better option for

132. Id.
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See ALASKA TITLE XXI PROGRAM FACT SHEET 2, available at http://www.
cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/AKCurrentFactsheet.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
138. Id.
139. See STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 10.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(A) (2006).
141. SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 8.
142. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE
CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS UNDER TITLE XXI OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ACT 7, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/
AK_FY2008CHIPAnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
143. Id.
144. See SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 7–8.
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Alaska because it will allow Alaska to receive performance bonus
payments.145
Because Denali KidCare is an entitlement program as a result of
being an expansion of Medicaid, there is no incentive to fill out the
forms on time.146 Limitations or restrictions on Denali KidCare cannot
be imposed as a result of tardy renewal.147 Since a recipient under
Medicaid can simply fill out an application whenever services are
desired, there is no incentive to apply on time. Fear of delayed
processing, however, may incentivize punctual application.148
In order to increase enrollments in rural areas—areas without
eligibility offices—the state is using a system of “Fee Agents.”149 Fee
Agents are community members trained in eligibility issues and paid on
a per-application basis, who assist people in the application process.150
Denali KidCare does not provide presumptive eligibility for
children.151 Retroactive eligibility is available—up to three months for
qualifying families.152 Denali KidCare has a mail-in application,
provides an application on its website, does not allow applications over
the phone, and does not allow applications online.153 It does not require
a face-to-face interview, but it requires children to be uninsured for a
minimum amount of time prior to enrollment.154
Denali KidCare serves an estimated 7900 Alaskan children155 and is
one of the cheapest medical assistance programs in Alaska, costing
approximately $1700 per child.156 It costs about twenty percent of what
adult senior coverage costs.157
B.

Qualifying Income Eligibility Standard

Alaska is one of only five states that funds its CHIP below 200% of
the FPG.158 Forty-four states and Washington, D.C. cover children and
families with incomes of 200% or higher of the FPG; thirty-three states
cover children and families with incomes between 200% and 250% of the
FPG; nineteen states and Washington, D.C. cover children and families
with income of 250% or higher of the FPG, and ten of those states cover
families with incomes of equal to or greater than 300% of the FPG.159

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

For a discussion of alternative options, see infra Part VI.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 70.
Id.
Id.
STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 10.
Id.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Hearing before S. Fin. Comm., supra note 113, at 9.
Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs, supra note 112, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Raising the Eligibility Level

For a family of four in Alaska, the poverty guideline for 2009 is
$27,570.160 For a family to qualify for Denali KidCare, it must earn less
than 175% of $27,570—that is, less than $48,247. The problem arises from
the fact that of thirteen policies available to a family of four, the average
price is $671.46 per month, or $8,057.52 per year.161 This means a family
of four would be spending an average of seventeen percent of its income
on health insurance. Even more problematic, a family of four earning
151% of the Alaska FPG—that is, $41,355 per year—is too wealthy to
qualify for Medicaid and thus would be spending as much as twenty
percent of its yearly income on health insurance. Because of this
problem, efforts are underway to raise the eligibility level.
In January of 2009, Alaska State Senator Bettye Davis proposed
Senate Bill No. 13 (S.B. 13).162 The purpose of S.B. 13 was to increase and
restore the qualifying income eligibility standard for Denali KidCare to
the original 200% level of the FPG, making health insurance accessible to
an estimated 1300 more uninsured children and 225 pregnant women in
Alaska.163
Representatives Sharon Cissna and Max Gruenberg introduced
House Bill No. 61 (H.B. 61) in January of 2009.164 This bill, like S.B. 13,
sought to raise the eligibility to 200% of the FPG for uninsured children
and pregnant women.165 However, H.B. 61 never made it out of the
Health & Social Services and Finance Committees.166 During the same
session, two additional House Bills introduced to increase the Denali
KidCare eligibility level to 200% also failed to leave the Health & Social
Services and Finance Committees.167
Though Democrats introduced most of the bills, support for raising
the eligibility level to at least 200% has support from both sides of the
aisle. For example, former Governor Palin supported increasing the
Denali KidCare eligibility to 200%.168 United States Senator Mark Begich
(D-Alaska)—previously mayor of Anchorage—also believes that the

160. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199, 4200
(Jan. 23, 2009).
161. See Blue Cross Blue Shield, Individual & Family Health Plans,
https://pbcbsak.inshealth.com/ehi/Alliance?allid=Pre25315 (last visited Apr.
10, 2010). This monthly cost was obtained from the Premera Blue Cross website,
using a family of four with two adults (both aged thirty-three), and two children
(ages four and five), on February 28, 2010.
162. S.B. 13, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009).
163. Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs, supra note 112, at 8.
164. H.B. 61, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009).
165. Id. at 4.
166. Legis. History for H.B. 26, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/
basis/get_complete_bill.asp?session=26&bill=HB61.
167. H.B. 62, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009); H.B. 118, 26th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Alaska 2009).
168. Press Release, Office of Alaska Governor (Dec. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/press/2008/Health_Priorities_120408.pdf.
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eligibility level should be increased, but he believes it should be
increased even higher than 200%.169
The Alaska Commission on Aging (ACoA) also supported S.B.
13.170 The ACoA believed that S.B. 13 would help the growing number
of older Alaskans who take care of their grandchildren while living on
fixed incomes.171 The ACoA cites a study showing that one in five senior
households with a grandchild present is at risk of hunger, compared to
one in twenty households without a grandchild present being at risk.172
In supporting S.B. 13, the ACoA was trying to protect grandparentheaded families that earned too much to qualify for Medicaid but not
enough to pay the rising costs of insurance.173
Additional support for raising the eligibility level came from the
Governor’s Health Care Strategies Council, which recommended
increasing the eligibility to 200% of the Alaska FPG.174 The Alaska
Health Care Strategies Planning Council also recommended raising the
eligibility standard from 175% to 200% of the FPG.175
Though increasing the eligibility to 200% has a great deal of
bipartisan support, some politicians believe it would be a bad policy
choice.176 Some Alaskan state senators have expressed concern over an
increase in costs and expenditures that would result from increasing the
income eligibility. For example, Senator Con Bunde—who voted against
S.B. 13—expressed his belief that “the state should work harder to
REDUCE, rather than expand state subsidies, not just to DKid Care, but
across the board.”177 He explained that Alaska has spent over $1 billion
more than it has received, and that at such a rate, Alaska’s reserves
would be depleted in three years.178
Senator Fred Dyson’s chief of staff described some of the reasons
why the senator had voted against S.B. 13. He explained that Senator
Dyson was concerned about “committing the state to increased future
outlays at a time when the state is facing deficit budgets for the next
several years.”179 He did not want to “increase benefits to Alaskans one

169. Letter from Mark Begich, U.S. Senator, to Gary Stevens, Bert Stedman &
Lyman Hoffman, Alaska Senators (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.
legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=26&docid=1294.
170. Letter from Denise Daniello, Executive Dir., Alaska Commission on
Aging, to Members of the Alaska Senate (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://
www.hss.state.ak.us/acoa/legislative/S.B.13.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 81.
175. ALASKA HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES PLANNING COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT 3
(2007), available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/commissioner/legislature/pdf/
HCSPC_report.pdf.
176. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 81.
177. E-mail from Con Bunde, Senator, Alaska State Senate, to Author (July 16,
2009) (on file with author).
178. Id.
179. E-mail from Lucky Shultz, Chief of Staff for Fred Dyson, Senator, Alaska
State Senate, to Author (July 13, 2009) (on file with author).
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year . . . then reduce the benefit through budget cutting at a later
date.”180 The state is having difficulties meeting its current obligations
due to: (1) fears of increased funding necessary for higher and lengthier
unemployment rates, (2) high costs of fuel in remote villages, and (3) the
quickly growing group of seniors in Alaska.181 Ultimately, Senator
Dyson claimed that it is “unconscionable” to “increase funding of one
group of people who are already receiving funding, while . . . denying
funds to Alaskans unable to meet immediate day-to-day costs to heat
their home during an Alaskan winter, or to put food on the table to feed
those same children, or to buy medicine for immediate needs . . . .”182
Staff to Senator Therriault commented that the vote against S.B. 13
came because of the concern that the legislation “will impose an
unsustainable financial obligation on Alaska’s treasury and be
politically difficult to take back if required to do so at a future date due
to declined oil revenue.”183 The fear of declining oil prices is also
causing apprehension toward expanding eligibility: oil prices need to
average at least $57/bbl in order to break even with the fiscal year 2010
budget. Currently, Alaska North Slope oil is trading around $60/bbl.184

V. TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF CHIPRA
As expressed by the Alaska senators who voted against S.B. 13,
costs and expenses associated with increasing the eligibility standard
are the primary obstacles. These concerns are valid and legitimate
because of the way Denali KidCare is currently set up. CHIPRA has
provided mechanisms for states to be financially able to increase
eligibility standards, but Alaska has not taken advantage of these
mechanisms. Two such mechanisms are the performance bonus
payments and outreach grants set up under CHIPRA.
A.

Performance Bonus Payments

If Alaska’s enrollment in Medicaid exceeds the target and Alaska
meets five of the eight criteria mentioned above, then Alaska will
qualify for bonus payments. Alaska, however, only meets four of the
eight criteria, disqualifying it from receiving the performance bonus
payments.
One criterion that Alaska could easily meet is the automatic
renewal criterion.185 Alaska is not saving money by requiring responses
to the renewal reminder. Of the cases that “auto-close”—meaning
people fail to respond to the renewal reminder—renewal was around
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. E-mail from Ernest Prax, Staff of Gene Therriault, Senator, Alaska State
Senate, to Author (July 10, 2009) (on file with author).
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(E) (2006).
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thirty percent within thirty days of expiration.186 An even greater
percentage renews their coverage after expiration within a six-month
period.187 Presumably, even more will renew when care is necessary, so
as to not have to pay out-of-pocket for their immediate medical
expenses.
Allowing automatic renewal—subject to notice that a family’s
circumstances have changed—would not burden the State because so
many families renew anyway. But the benefits to Alaska could be
substantial if automatic renewal is provided. Automatic renewal is one
of the eight criteria that qualify states for performance bonuses under
CHIPRA; if Alaska were to adopt automatic renewal, it would meet five
of the necessary criteria to qualify for the performance bonuses. Thus,
the benefit of providing automatic renewal far outweighs any nominal
costs associated with it.
B.

Outreach Grants

Alaska could be a strong contender for receiving outreach grants
established under CHIPRA. The priority regions for the outreach grants
are those with high rates of children in rural areas who are unenrolled
but eligible, as well as those regions with high percentages of racial and
ethnic minorities.188 Approximately fifteen percent of the Alaskan
population is Alaska Native or American Indian.189 According to Alaska
Native Tribal Health Consortium research, this minority group could
also be considered a “health disparity population” under CHIPRA.190
The State of Alaska can demonstrate all of the necessary requirements to
qualify for these grants:191 it has a history and has established
relationships with the Alaska Native population; it has the ability to
address barriers to enrollment (for example, the Alaska Native Tribal
Health Consortium has made concerted education efforts); and the State
has the capital and resources to measure quality and results.
Presumably, a state would take advantage of essentially free
federal money, especially when it has a CHIP fully in place. But the
State of Alaska has decided not to apply for these outreach grants. The
exact reasoning for not applying for these grants is unclear. The forgone
benefits are, however, clear—by not applying, the State gives up the
opportunity to receive a grant of $1 million, which could pay for half the

186. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 70.
187. Id.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(b)(1) (2006).
189. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ALASKA QUICK FACTS (2009), http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
190. Alaska Native Health Status Report, Alaska Native Tribal Health
Consortium,
available at
http://www.anthc.org/chs/epicenter/upload/
ANHSR.pdf.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(c)(1)–(4) (2006).
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total cost of increasing the Denali KidCare eligibility level from 175% to
200%.192
In response to an inquiry as to why the State decided not to apply
for the outreach grants, the commissioner of the Department of Health
and Social Services wrote, “[W]e have chosen to support our community
partners in their efforts. We will continue to work with them to identify
and support their outreach strategies, particularly those that ensure that
those kids and families most in need are enrolled in the program.”193
Admittedly, the State’s application would discourage other
organizations from applying for the grants. However, the breadth of the
state government and its available capital make it the best user of these
grants—especially when the grants could help the State afford to cover
more children under Denali KidCare.
C.

Providing Insurance Can Save Money

In the context of Denali KidCare, it is possible that providing lowincome children with health insurance will save Alaska money in the
long run. Uninsured children with a medical need are five times more
likely not to have a regular doctor, and four times as likely to use
emergency rooms—which are considerably more expensive than a
routine visit to the doctor.194
It is argued that insured children are less expensive to the State
than uninsured children. Politicians of all ranks and affiliations posit
that preventive care saves money in the long run. Former Senator John
Edwards (D-N.C.) stated, “Study after study shows that primary and
preventive care greatly reduces future health care costs, as well as
increasing patients’ health.”195 Former Governor Mike Huckabee (RArk.) has said that preventive care “would save countless lives, pain
and suffering . . . and billions of dollars.”196 But it may not be so simple.
In order to determine whether preventive care will save money,
cost-benefit analyses must be done for each type of treatment to
determine which methods of preventive care will result in cost
savings.197 Denali KidCare could greatly benefit from research detailing
whether the treatments received by low-income children in the program
result in cost savings. Other states have done similar research for their
respective CHIPs and have made optimistic projections for their
programs’ cost savings.

192. OVERVIEW OF GRANTS, supra note 89, at 2.
193. E-mail from William Hogan, Commissioner, Alaska Department of
Health and Social Services, to author (July 20, 2009) (on file with author).
194. Hearing before S. Fin. Comm., supra note 113, at 9.
195. Joshua T. Cohen, Peter J. Neumann & Milton C. Weinstein, Does
Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2008).
196. Id.
197. See generally id.
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Texas, for example, investigated increasing costs for its CHIP in
2001. The Texas Legislative Budget Board—charged with writing the
official cost estimates for legislation—estimated that Texas would save
$4.6 billion over the course of ten years, and $10 billion over the course
of twenty years from “reduced emergency room use, reduced hospital
days, increased immunizations, and reduced charity care.”198 Assuming
its situation is similar to Texas’, Alaska could experience great savings
by increasing eligibility to 200%.
D.

Costs Are Low

Relative to Alaska’s 2009 budget—$10.1 billion199—increasing
Denali KidCare’s eligibility level to 200% would not have a drastic effect
on the budget. The total cost of increasing the eligibility level to 200%
would be around $2.7 million, which is approximately 0.03% of the
fiscal year 2010 budget.200 Additionally, the State of Alaska would not be
paying the entirety of those costs, as the federal government matches
the costs with the allotted funds at the enhanced FMAP rate.
With the enhanced FMAP, CHIP is a much cheaper way to fund
health insurance programs for children. United States Senator Mark
Begich called Denali KidCare “frankly a very good deal.”201 Senator
Begich was referring to the enhanced FMAP, which for Alaska is at
sixty-six percent—compared to the FMAP for Medicaid, which is at
fifty-one percent.202 This means that of the $2.7 million in additional
costs incurred by increasing the eligibility level, the State of Alaska
would only be paying thirty-three percent of the total cost, or a mere
$900,000. This $900,000 amounts to 0.0089% of the annual budget.
Alaska would be insuring 1300 additional children for only $692 per
child, per year; or $58 per child, per month.
Before CHIPRA, the federal government would have allocated
Alaska $10.4 million to fund Denali KidCare for fiscal year 2009.203
CHIPRA increased this allocation by over 200% with around $24 million

198. ANNE DUNKELBERG, CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRIORITIES, STATUS REPORT:
CHILDREN’S MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY SIMPLIFICATION, 2 (2001), available at http://
www.cppp.org/files/3/pp125.pdf.
199. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STATE OF ALASKA, FISCAL 2010
ENACTED FISCAL SUMMARY (2009), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/
10_omb/budget/10%20PDFs/FY2010_Fiscal_Summary_5-20-09.pdf.
200. See Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs, supra note 112.
201. See Letter from Mark Begich, supra note 169, at 2.
202. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST.,
FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGES AND ENHANCED FEDERAL MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGES FY 2009—FY 2011 (2009), available at http://ccf.
georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=policy/financing/fmap.pdf.
203. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST.,
ESTIMATED ALLOTMENTS UNDER CHIPRA 2009 (2009), available at http://ccf.
georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=policy/2009S-CHIPreauth/
estimated allotments.pdf.
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allotted from the federal government.204 Before the increase in CHIPRA
allotments, Denali KidCare served around 7900 children.205 With an
increase from the 175% eligibility to 200% eligibility, it is estimated that
an additional 1300 children will be covered;206 this would be an increase
of approximately sixteen percent. The increased allocation under
CHIPRA of over 200% to $24 million more than covers the cost of
enrolling an additional sixteen percent of children in Denali KidCare if
the eligibility is increased. Therefore, budgetary pressures are not a
compelling reason for not supporting an increase in the eligibility.

CONCLUSION
A man is drowning in the ocean. He prays for God to help him.
God does not respond. A small fishing boat approaches the man, and
offers to save him. The man says no, for he is a man of faith, and God
will save him. He continues to pray, and still no response from God. A
second vessel—a ship with a life raft—approaches the man, and tries to
save him. Yet the man denies rescue again: he is a man of faith, and God
will save him. The man is near death when the Coast Guard finally
arrives with a helicopter to save him. With the little life he has left, he
avoids and denies the rescue: for he is a man of faith, and God will save
him. The man died. In the next life, he found himself conversing with
God; and out of curiosity, he asked God why God did not decide to save
such a staunch believer. God responded: “I tried to save you three times;
I sent you a boat, a ship, and a helicopter, yet you denied them all.”
Alaska is being sent a boat, a ship, and a helicopter. For some
reason, though, it continues to deny rescue. Alaska is rejecting the
opportunity to insure an additional 1300 children for the mere price of
$58 per child, per month. It is rejecting the opportunity to insure an
additional 1300 children for the price of 0.0089% of its annual budget.
The federal government is providing lifeboats in the form of
performance bonus payments and outreach grants, yet Alaska is
rejecting those too.
Alaska is known for many great and distinct attributes, but the
Alaska Legislature should no longer allow the state to be known for
being one of five states limiting CHIP eligibility to less than 200%.
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